

## The syntropic solution to the impasse on the issue of human will

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### **Abstract:**

The current dominant position on the issue of human will is skepticism, namely the inability to assert whether human will is free or not. In this paper I propose the syntropic solution as a vision that integrates the two contrasting approaches: compatibilism and incompatibilism.

### **The issue:**

Firstly, let us consider the definition of scientific universal determinism provided by Prof. M. De Caro<sup>2</sup>, the Italian leading expert on human will: "*Let's consider that  $t_0$  indicates any instant in the history of the universe,  $t_1$  any instant after  $t_0$ ,  $P_0$  the proposition that expresses the physical state of the universe at time  $t_0$ , the proposition  $P_1$  expresses the physical state of the universe as at  $t_1$  and  $L$  the set of scientific laws. According to scientific determinism, then, " $\text{Nec} (P_0 + L) \Rightarrow P_1$ "<sup>3</sup>. Syntropy follows this formula: ' $\text{Nec} (P_0 + L_0) \Rightarrow P_1$ '; ' $\text{Nec} (P_1 + L_1) \Rightarrow P_0$ '. Where  $L_0$  represents the set of scientific laws defining directional time in classic entropy, and  $L_1$  the negative syntropic solution. We will return to this formulation at a later stage.*

The international community is torn between three basic approaches: compatibilism, incompatibilism and skepticism.

Compatibilism provides a reconciliation with universal determinism. Here the subject cannot be defined as "free". In practice, a sufficient number of causes exists that determine the choice of the subject. Of course there are many versions of compatibilism, but this is the most general definition.

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<sup>2</sup> M. De Caro, *Il libero arbitrio – Una introduzione*. Editori Laterza (2011). Page 15.

<sup>3</sup> As claimed by prof. M. De Caro there are many forms of determinism. This formula can be considered the most general. Bi-determinism is a *Weltanschauung* – that is, a vision of the world as many others – just like determinism. As such, it may be accepted or rejected, but it remains an overall view that can only be proved through evidence.

On the opposite side stand the liberal, indeterministic incompatibilists who claim that will implies a fully imponderable freedom that does not respond to scientific universal determinism.

Skeptics, however, believe that the issue of human will is irresolvable. The matter is unquestionably conflictual and there exists strong evidence in favor of each approach as well as weaknesses that bring into discussion both compatibilism and incompatibilism. The third approach, instead, being skeptic by its very nature, is not subject to weaknesses.

I will now proceed with analyzing the weaknesses.

Compatibilism argues that the subject has several choices that are deterministic by nature. On the other hand, incompatibilists following scientific universal determinism claim that choice is an illusion and does not provide any kind of choice. In practice, the subject will do only what lies within the scope of his possibility. The weak point of the liberalist approach, instead, is the issue of *control*. Freedom seems similar to randomness, but if freedom is random then the individual is not free.

Skepticism is currently the most popular approach as it claims that we do not have the capacity to truly understand the issue.

This is the current situation on the problem of human will, which poses a big impasse.

### ***The syntropic solution:***

In 2012, an article on physics was published which casually dealt with the issue of human will<sup>4</sup>. The article proposed a "function" that would integrate intelligent compatibilist and incompatibilist elements in a differential equation.

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<sup>4</sup> S. Hossenfelder, *The free will function*. History and Philosophy of Physics (2012).




Fig. 1: Progression of human will.

By looking at the equation above, one can easily understand that the verse is directional and determined, but not deterministic. The function meets the nodes and can follow many variants, while its tail is perfectly determinable<sup>5</sup>. This solution, however, runs into the same impasse as incompatibilism, namely, is the choice between nodes random? If that is the case, then the equation provides no progress with respect to the impasse encountered by incompatibilism.

I therefore opted for a syntropic solution that completely solves this problem. The orientation of the subject in the choice is pointed backwards due to the anticipated potentials, as shown in the figure below:

<sup>5</sup> F. D'Agostino. *Il libero arbitrio – una visione scientifica COMPENDIO*. Narcissus (2015).




Fig. 2 retrocausality action.

By looking at the arrow, we see that it starts from the bottom to arrive to a node where retrocausality then directs it toward an array of possible branches. This setting possesses characteristics that are both compatibilist and incompatibilist as it provides a tight determinism oriented ahead but also a “free” solution, namely the one in which the subject is oriented by the anticipated potentials that eliminate the possibility of randomness.

In reality, free will does not exist!

Will is not free because potential anticipatory factors resolve with a high-level emergency solution the issue of choice. I am currently trying to determine where these anticipatory solutions are produced and I am also studying dreams with the method of lucid dreams. However, it is still too early to draw any conclusions.

***Developments:***

If I carry out an action and receive an information from the future, I will "feel" how to act in the best possible way from a syntropic perspective. I will consequentially choose a direction that is already written in the future but of which I am aware and at once directed by. This can lead to two situations:

$\alpha$ ) Potentials originating from supercausality guide us along possible decision trees. Weak version. Free will does not exist because it always chooses what is considered real<sup>6</sup>. The future is therefore already written, even though you can still commit an "error" by choosing an entropic solution.

$\beta$ ) or that potentials originating from supercausality already "know" what I will choose. Strong version. Free will does not exist, because a subject chooses only what he can choose (version of Maturana's constructivism<sup>7</sup> applied to syntropic free will). The subject can decide that the real solution is the entropic one.

Versions  $\alpha$ ) and  $\beta$ ) are practically the same. The future is already written depending on whether priority is given to the agent or to the environment.

The potentials that come to us only make us more aware and presumably enable us to predict future events, whose prediction will not change the course of the future but simply turn us into informed, observant subjects. This vision of two-way time-determinism makes the intersection of human will thoroughly not-free, because the syntropic or entropic choice given by a decision tree depends on the subject's ability to perceive and interpret the anticipated potentials correctly. However, this "skill" does not change the two-way determinism.

In conclusion, the syntropic solution resolves the impasse.

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<sup>6</sup> F. D'Agostino. *Il libero arbitrio una visione scientifica*. Narcissus (2014).

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.